Sciweavers

36 search results - page 6 / 8
» Super Solutions for Combinatorial Auctions
Sort
View
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
144views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2003»
14 years 28 days ago
Security model for a multi-agent marketplace
A multi-agent marketplace, MAGNET (Multi AGent Negotiation Testbed), is a promising solution to conduct online combinatorial auctions. The trust model of MAGNET is somewhat diffe...
Ashutosh Jaiswal, Yongdae Kim, Maria L. Gini
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
Finding approximate competitive equilibria: efficient and fair course allocation
In the course allocation problem, a university administrator seeks to efficiently and fairly allocate schedules of over-demanded courses to students with heterogeneous preferences...
Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm, Eric Budish
FOCS
2005
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
Mechanism Design via Machine Learning
We use techniques from sample-complexity in machine learning to reduce problems of incentive-compatible mechanism design to standard algorithmic questions, for a wide variety of r...
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartlin...
AIPS
2003
13 years 9 months ago
Economically Augmented Job Shop Scheduling
We present economically augmented job shop scheduling (EJSP) as an example of a coordination problem among selfinterested agents with private information. We discuss its signific...
Wolfram Conen
AIR
2004
111views more  AIR 2004»
13 years 7 months ago
Towards Fast Vickrey Pricing using Constraint Programming
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan