We consider the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria in graphical games. It is known that the problem is NP-complete in general, but tractable (i.e., in P) for special...
We analyze the complexity of computing pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in symmetric games with a fixed number of actions. We restrict ourselves to “compact” representati...
Christopher Thomas Ryan, Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin L...
We examine correlated equilibria in the recently introduced formalism of graphical games, a succinct representation for multiplayer games. We establish a natural and powerful rela...
Sham Kakade, Michael J. Kearns, John Langford, Lui...
We define the class of games called simulation-based games, in which the payoffs are available as an output of an oracle (simulator), rather than specified analytically or using a...
Graphical games have been proposed as a game-theoretic model of large-scale distributed networks of non-cooperative agents. When the number of players is large, and the underlying...
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldber...