Abstract. We propose various models for lobbying in a probabilistic environment, in which an actor (called “The Lobby”) seeks to influence the voters’ preferences of voting ...
We extend work by Christian et al. [Review of Economic Design 2007] on lobbying in multiple referenda by first providing a more fine-grained analysis of the computational comple...
Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Sepp Hartung, Rolf ...
We investigate issues regarding two hard problems related to voting, the optimal weighted lobbying problem and the winner problem for Dodgson elections. Regarding the former, Chris...
Group elevator scheduling is an NP-hard sequential decision-making problem with unbounded state spaces and substantial uncertainty. Decision-theoretic reasoning plays a surprising...
We analyze the complexity of subsumption in probabilistic variants of the description logic EL. In the case where probabilities apply only to concepts, we map out the borderline be...