29 search results - page 3 / 6 » The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions |
INFOCOM
2010
IEEE
13 years 6 months ago
2010
IEEE
—We propose a virtualization framework to separate the network operator (NO) who focuses on wireless resource management and service providers (SP) who target distinct objectives...
STACS
2004
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
2004
Springer
We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for a set of identical items. We adopt the worst case competitive framework defined by [1,2] that compares the profit of an ...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
14 years 29 days ago
2003
ACM
We study auctions for a commodity in unlimited supply, e.g., a digital good. In particular we consider three desirable properties for auctions: • Competitive: the auction achiev...
LATIN
2010
Springer
14 years 25 days ago
2010
Springer
We explore the revenue capabilities of truthful, monotone (“fair”) allocation and pricing functions for resource-constrained auction mechanisms within a general framework that ...
INFOCOM
2011
IEEE
12 years 11 months ago
2011
IEEE
—Online spectrum auctions offer ample flexibility for bidders to request and obtain spectrum on-the-fly. Such flexibility, however, opens up new vulnerabilities to bidder mani...