— We design truthful double spectrum auctions where multiple parties can trade spectrum based on their individual needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing sp...
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that motivates selfish rational agents to make a costly probabilistic estim...
Athanasios Papakonstantinou, Alex Rogers, Enrico H...
Spectrum is a critical yet scarce resource and it has been shown that dynamic spectrum access can significantly improve spectrum utilization. To achieve this, it is important to ...
To address coordination and complexity issues, we formulate a grid task allocation problem as a bargaining based self-adaptive auction and propose the BarSAA grid task-bundle alloc...
We consider the problem of designing auctions with worst case revenue guarantees for sponsored search. This problem differs from previous work because of ad dependent clickthroug...