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» The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions
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INFOCOM
2009
IEEE
14 years 2 months ago
TRUST: A General Framework for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions
— We design truthful double spectrum auctions where multiple parties can trade spectrum based on their individual needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing sp...
Xia Zhou, Haitao Zheng
ECAI
2008
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
A Truthful Two-Stage Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilistic Estimates with Unknown Costs
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that motivates selfish rational agents to make a costly probabilistic estim...
Athanasios Papakonstantinou, Alex Rogers, Enrico H...
MOBIHOC
2009
ACM
14 years 2 months ago
Revenue generation for truthful spectrum auction in dynamic spectrum access
Spectrum is a critical yet scarce resource and it has been shown that dynamic spectrum access can significantly improve spectrum utilization. To achieve this, it is important to ...
Juncheng Jia, Qian Zhang, Qin Zhang, Mingyan Liu
CCGRID
2009
IEEE
13 years 8 months ago
Efficient Grid Task-Bundle Allocation Using Bargaining Based Self-Adaptive Auction
To address coordination and complexity issues, we formulate a grid task allocation problem as a bargaining based self-adaptive auction and propose the BarSAA grid task-bundle alloc...
Han Zhao, Xiaolin Li
WINE
2007
Springer
193views Economy» more  WINE 2007»
14 years 1 months ago
Auctions with Revenue Guarantees for Sponsored Search
We consider the problem of designing auctions with worst case revenue guarantees for sponsored search. This problem differs from previous work because of ad dependent clickthroug...
Zoë Abrams, Arpita Ghosh