We consider the stable marriage problem where participants are permitted to express indifference in their preference lists (i.e., each list can be partially ordered). We prove tha...
Abstract. The stable marriage problem has many practical applications in twosided markets like those that assign doctors to hospitals, students to schools, or buyers to vendors. Mo...
Enrico Pilotto, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent Ven...
We consider the Stable Marriage Problem and the Stable Roommates Problem in presence of ties and incomplete preference lists. They can be solved by centralized algorithms, but this...
We study variants of classical stable matching problems in which there is an additional requirement for a stable matching, namely that there should not be two participants who wou...
For stable marriage (SM) and solvable stable roommates (SR) instances, it is known that there are stable matchings that assign each participant to his or her (lower/upper) median ...