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» Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
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FOCS
2008
IEEE
14 years 5 months ago
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents
Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin...
CORR
2010
Springer
147views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 11 months ago
Single Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations
We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions w...
Gagan Goel, Chinmay Karande, Lei Wang
AAIM
2005
Springer
75views Algorithms» more  AAIM 2005»
14 years 4 months ago
Mechanism Design for Set Cover Games When Elements Are Agents
In this paper we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents. In this case, each element has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets,...
Zheng Sun, Xiang-Yang Li, Weizhao Wang, Xiaowen Ch...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
105views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
14 years 4 months ago
Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework
The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...
Ming-Yang Kao, Xiang-Yang Li, Weizhao Wang
TCS
2010
13 years 5 months ago
Maximizing the minimum load for selfish agents
We consider the problem of maximizing the minimum load for machines that are controlled by selfish agents, who are only interested in maximizing their own profit. Unlike the class...
Leah Epstein, Rob van Stee