We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there...
In this paper we present the internal architecture and bidding mechanisms designed for Mertacor, a successful trading agent, which ended up first in the Classic Trading Agent Comp...
Panos Toulis, Dionisis Kehagias, Pericles A. Mitka...
Game theory is popular in agent systems for designing auctions with desirable properties. However, many of these properties will only hold if the game and its properties are commo...
We study the geometrical shape of the partitions of the input space created by the allocation rule of a truthful mechanism for multi-unit auctions with multidimensional types and ...
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...