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CORR
2010
Springer
128views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 4 months ago
Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy
We consider the problem of designing a revenue-maximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there...
Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Mertacor: a successful autonomous trading agent
In this paper we present the internal architecture and bidding mechanisms designed for Mertacor, a successful trading agent, which ended up first in the Classic Trading Agent Comp...
Panos Toulis, Dionisis Kehagias, Pericles A. Mitka...
IAT
2006
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
Realising Common Knowledge Assumptions in Agent Auctions
Game theory is popular in agent systems for designing auctions with desirable properties. However, many of these properties will only hold if the game and its properties are commo...
Frank Guerin, Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine
WINE
2009
Springer
178views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 2 months ago
The Geometry of Truthfulness
We study the geometrical shape of the partitions of the input space created by the allocation rule of a truthful mechanism for multi-unit auctions with multidimensional types and ...
Angelina Vidali
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
112views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
14 years 27 days ago
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm