86 search results - page 12 / 18 » Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms |
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2006
Springer
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions w...
ATAL
2007
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
2007
Springer
In a dynamic market, being able to update one’s value based on information available to other bidders currently in the market can be critical to having profitable transactions. ...
INFOCOM
2011
IEEE
12 years 11 months ago
2011
IEEE
—Online spectrum auctions offer ample flexibility for bidders to request and obtain spectrum on-the-fly. Such flexibility, however, opens up new vulnerabilities to bidder mani...
CISSE
2007
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
2007
Springer
In an ad-hoc Grid environment where producers and consumers compete for providing and employing resources, trade handling in a fair and stable way is a challenging task. Dynamic ch...