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» Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms
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AIR
2004
111views more  AIR 2004»
13 years 7 months ago
Towards Fast Vickrey Pricing using Constraint Programming
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
110views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 2 months ago
On random sampling auctions for digital goods
In the context of auctions for digital goods, an interesting Random Sampling Optimal Price auction (RSOP) has been proposed by Goldberg, Hartline and Wright; this leads to a truth...
Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian, Aravind Srinivasa...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation
Abstract. We introduce take-it-or-leave-it auctions (TLAs) as an allocation mechanism that allows buyers to retain much of their private valuation information, yet generates close-...
Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin
CORR
2010
Springer
156views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 7 months ago
Selling Privacy at Auction
We initiate the study of markets for private data, through the lens of differential privacy. Although the purchase and sale of private data has already begun on a large scale, a t...
Arpita Ghosh, Aaron Roth
ATAL
2007
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
Analysing Buyers' and Sellers' Strategic Interactions in Marketplaces: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach
We develop a new model to analyse the strategic behaviour of buyers and sellers in market mechanisms. In particular, we wish to understand how the different strategies they adopt ...
Perukrishnen Vytelingum, Dave Cliff, Nicholas R. J...