Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
In the context of auctions for digital goods, an interesting Random Sampling Optimal Price auction (RSOP) has been proposed by Goldberg, Hartline and Wright; this leads to a truth...
Abstract. We introduce take-it-or-leave-it auctions (TLAs) as an allocation mechanism that allows buyers to retain much of their private valuation information, yet generates close-...
We initiate the study of markets for private data, through the lens of differential privacy. Although the purchase and sale of private data has already begun on a large scale, a t...
We develop a new model to analyse the strategic behaviour of buyers and sellers in market mechanisms. In particular, we wish to understand how the different strategies they adopt ...
Perukrishnen Vytelingum, Dave Cliff, Nicholas R. J...