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MANSCI
2006
73views more  MANSCI 2006»
13 years 7 months ago
Agent Competition Double-Auction Mechanism
We propose an agent competition double auction (AC-DA) mechanism in this paper. The AC-DA mechanism is strategy-proof, individual rational, and weakly budget-balanced if the gener...
Leon Yang Chu, Zuo-Jun Max Shen
FOCS
2005
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As common in the ï¬...
Anna R. Karlin, David Kempe, Tami Tamir
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Reducing price fluctuation in continuous double auctions through pricing policy and shout improvement
Auction mechanism design is a subfield of game theory dedicated to manipulating the rules of an auction so as to achieve specific goals. The complexity of the dynamics of auctions...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Elizabeth Sk...
STOC
2006
ACM
107views Algorithms» more  STOC 2006»
14 years 7 months ago
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
93views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
14 years 27 days ago
Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibility result
In many market settings, agents do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they may have to solve computationally complex optimization problems, query databases, or perform ...
Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm