86 search results - page 8 / 18 » Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms |
ECAI
2008
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2008
Springer
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that motivates selfish rational agents to make a costly probabilistic estim...
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
2007
Springer
We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purch...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2006
Springer
Most research on auctions assumes that potential bidders have private information about their willingness to pay for the item being auctioned, and that they use this information s...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
14 years 9 days ago
2010
ACM
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for singl...
WECWIS
2003
IEEE
14 years 22 days ago
2003
IEEE
The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable. In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations, and parties involved cannot rely on ex...