In this paper we investigate extensions of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms to problems whose objective function is not utilitarian and whose agents’ utiliti...
Giovanna Melideo, Paolo Penna, Guido Proietti, Rog...
The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...
We examine a setting in which a buyer wishes to purchase probabilistic information from some agent. The seller must invest effort in order to gain access to the information, and m...
As chip multiprocessors (CMPs) become increasingly mainstream, architects have likewise become more interested in how best to share a cache hierarchy among multiple simultaneous t...
Lisa R. Hsu, Steven K. Reinhardt, Ravishankar R. I...
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...