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» Truthful Mechanisms for Generalized Utilitarian Problems
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WWW
2009
ACM
14 years 8 months ago
General auction mechanism for search advertising
In sponsored search, a number of advertising slots is available on a search results page, and have to be allocated among a set of advertisers competing to display an ad on the pag...
Dávid Pál, Gagan Aggarwal, Martin P&...

Publication
466views
14 years 6 months ago
Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions
In pay-per click sponsored search auctions which are cur- rently extensively used by search engines, the auction for a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k) c...
Akash Das Sarma, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
93views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
14 years 25 days ago
Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibility result
In many market settings, agents do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they may have to solve computationally complex optimization problems, query databases, or perform ...
Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
83views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 1 months ago
The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions
We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the class...
Nikhil R. Devanur, Sham M. Kakade
ACMICEC
2006
ACM
111views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2006»
13 years 11 months ago
Passive verification of the strategyproofness of mechanisms in open environments
Consider an open infrastructure in which anyone can deploy mechanisms to support automated decision making and coordination amongst self-interested computational agents. Strategyp...
Laura Kang, David C. Parkes