33 search results - page 4 / 7 » Truthful Mechanisms for Generalized Utilitarian Problems |
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
14 years 29 days ago
2005
ACM
This paper concerns the design of mechanisms for online scheduling in which agents bid for access to a re-usable resource such as processor time or wireless network access. Each a...
APSEC
2007
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
2007
IEEE
A customer reported problem (or Trouble Ticket) in software maintenance is typically solved by one or more maintenance engineers. The decision of allocating the ticket to one or m...
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
14 years 20 days ago
2003
ACM
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism ...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2006
Springer
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2008
Springer
We consider a multiagent resource allocation domain where the marginal production of each resource is diminishing. A set of identical, self-interested agents requires access to sh...