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» Truthful Mechanisms for Generalized Utilitarian Problems
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AIR
2004
111views more  AIR 2004»
13 years 7 months ago
Towards Fast Vickrey Pricing using Constraint Programming
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan
SIGECOM
2006
ACM
125views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2006»
14 years 1 months ago
Minimum payments that reward honest reputation feedback
Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function effectively. Self interested agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the cost of reporting and th...
Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
IPPS
2008
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
A game theoretical data replication technique for mobile ad hoc networks
Adaptive replication of data items on servers of a mobile ad hoc network can alleviate access delays. The selection of data items and servers requires solving a constrained optimi...
Samee Ullah Khan, Anthony A. Maciejewski, Howard J...
INFOCOM
2012
IEEE
11 years 9 months ago
Combinatorial auction with time-frequency flexibility in cognitive radio networks
—In this paper, we tackle the spectrum allocation problem in cognitive radio (CR) networks with time-frequency flexibility consideration using combinatorial auction. Different f...
Mo Dong, Gaofei Sun, Xinbing Wang, Qian Zhang
AIPS
2003
13 years 8 months ago
A Framework for Planning with Extended Goals under Partial Observability
Planning in nondeterministic domains with temporally extended goals under partial observability is one of the most challenging problems in planning. Subsets of this problem have b...
Piergiorgio Bertoli, Alessandro Cimatti, Marco Pis...