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» Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
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SOFSEM
2009
Springer
14 years 3 months ago
When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures
Abstract. Computational mechanism design (CMD) seeks to understand how to design game forms that induce desirable outcomes in multiagent systems despite private information, self-i...
David C. Parkes
INFOCOM
2011
IEEE
12 years 10 months ago
Strategyproof auctions for balancing social welfare and fairness in secondary spectrum markets
Abstract—Secondary spectrum access is emerging as a promising approach for mitigating the spectrum scarcity in wireless networks. Coordinated spectrum access for secondary users ...
Ajay Gopinathan, Zongpeng Li, Chuan Wu
AIR
2004
111views more  AIR 2004»
13 years 6 months ago
Towards Fast Vickrey Pricing using Constraint Programming
Ensuring truthfulness amongst self-interested agents bidding against one another in an auction can be computationally expensive when prices are determined using the Vickrey-Clarke-...
Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan
INFOCOM
2011
IEEE
12 years 10 months ago
A prior-free revenue maximizing auction for secondary spectrum access
—Dynamic spectrum allocation has proven promising for mitigating the spectrum scarcity problem. In this model, primary users lease chunks of under-utilized spectrum to secondary ...
Ajay Gopinathan, Zongpeng Li
ATAL
2011
Springer
12 years 6 months ago
Online mechanism design for electric vehicle charging
Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles are expected to place a considerable strain on local electricity distribution networks, requiring charging to be coordinated in order to accommoda...
Enrico H. Gerding, Valentin Robu, Sebastian Stein,...