In a class of games known as Stackelberg games, one agent (the leader) must commit to a strategy that can be observed by the other agent (the follower or adversary) before the adv...
Praveen Paruchuri, Jonathan P. Pearce, Janusz Mare...
The paper studies the problem of reachability for linear systems in the presence of uncertain input disturbances that may also be interpreted as the action of an adversary in a ga...
Prediction from expert advice is a fundamental problem in machine learning. A major pillar of the field is the existence of learning algorithms whose average loss approaches that ...
How do we build multiagent algorithms for agent interactions with human adversaries? Stackelberg games are natural models for many important applications that involve human intera...
We initiate the study of two-party cryptographic primitives with unconditional security, assuming that the adversary's quantum memory is of bounded size. We show that oblivio...