This site uses cookies to deliver our services and to ensure you get the best experience. By continuing to use this site, you consent to our use of cookies and acknowledge that you have read and understand our Privacy Policy, Cookie Policy, and Terms
Motivated by the problem of querying and communicating bidders’ valuations in combinatorial auctions, we study how well different classes of set functions can be sketched. More...
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu,...
We consider submodular optimization problems, and provide a general way of translating oracle inapproximability results arising from the symmetry gap technique to computational co...
We consider the parallels between the preference elicitation problem in combinatorial auctions and the problem of learning an unknown function from learning theory. We show that l...
ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for Auction Mechanisms E. M. Tadjouddine, F. Guerin, and W. Vasconcelos Department of Computing Science, King's College, University of Abe...
Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin, Wamberto We...
Allocating scarce resources among agents to maximize global utility is, in general, computationally challenging. We focus on problems where resources enable agents to execute acti...