A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing in...
Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Ev...
Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, in...
Abstract. We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [2] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions and for public project problems, and in each case so...
We present a mechanism for auctioning bandwidth on a network-wide basis to end users or ISPs that will utilize it for the same time period. This mechanism consists of a set of sim...
Manos Dramitinos, George D. Stamoulis, Costas Cour...
We consider a multiagent resource allocation domain where the marginal production of each resource is diminishing. A set of identical, self-interested agents requires access to sh...