Effective norms, emerging from sustained individual interactions over time, can complement societal rules and significantly enhance performance of individual agents and agent soci...
Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, in...
In a class of games known as Stackelberg games, one agent (the leader) must commit to a strategy that can be observed by the other agent (the follower or adversary) before the adv...
Praveen Paruchuri, Jonathan P. Pearce, Janusz Mare...
In many multiagent settings, each agent's goal is to come out ahead of the other agents on some metric, such as the currency obtained by the agent. In such settings, it is no...
We address the learning of trust based on past observations and context information. We argue that from the truster's point of view trust is best expressed as one of several ...