We examine a class of wagering mechanisms designed to elicit truthful predictions from a group of people without requiring any outside subsidy. We propose a number of desirable pr...
Nicolas S. Lambert, John Langford, Jennifer Wortma...
Online peer production systems have enabled people to coactively create, share, classify, and rate content on an unprecedented scale. This paper describes strong macroscopic regul...
One attractive feature of market scoring rules [Hanson '03] is that they are myopically strategyproof: It is optimal for a trader to report her true belief about the likeliho...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that (in unrestricted settings) any reasonable voting rule is manipulable. Recently, a quantitative version of this theorem was proved by ...
Prediction markets efficiently extract and aggregate the private information held by individuals about events and facts that can be publicly verified. However, facts such as the e...