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SIGECOM
2009
ACM
132views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 3 months ago
Limited and online supply and the bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design
We study auctions for selling a limited supply of a single commodity in the case where the supply is known in advance and the case it is unknown and must be instead allocated in a...
Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
216views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 3 months ago
Approximate mechanism design without money
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot b...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
139views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 3 months ago
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...
Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
112views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 3 months ago
Network bargaining: algorithms and structural results
We consider models for bargaining in social networks, in which players are represented by vertices and edges represent bilateral opportunities for deals between pairs of players. ...
Tanmoy Chakraborty, Michael Kearns, Sanjeev Khanna
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
95views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 3 months ago
Eliciting truthful answers to multiple-choice questions
Motivated by the prevalence of online questionnaires in electronic commerce, and of multiple-choice questions in such questionnaires, we consider the problem of eliciting truthful...
Nicolas S. Lambert, Yoav Shoham