This paper characterizes the family of truthful doublesided auctions. Despite the importance of double-sided auctions to market design, to date no characterization of truthful dou...
We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purch...
Atsushi Iwasaki, David Kempe, Yasumasa Saito, Mahy...
Motivated by the growth of various networked systems as potential market places, we study market models wherein, owing to the size of the markets, transactions take place between l...
Atish Das Sarma, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Sreenivas ...
This paper presents our approach to the rule extraction problem from trained neural network. A method called REX is briefly described. REX acquires a set of fuzzy rules using an ev...
We consider the problem of designing auctions with worst case revenue guarantees for sponsored search. This problem differs from previous work because of ad dependent clickthroug...