Sciweavers

40 search results - page 5 / 8
» wine 2009
Sort
View
WINE
2009
Springer
128views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 2 months ago
Sequential Bidding in the Bailey-Cavallo Mechanism
Abstract. We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [2] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions and for public project problems, and in each case so...
Krzysztof R. Apt, Evangelos Markakis
WINE
2009
Springer
117views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 2 months ago
Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders
We study the problem of identifying prices to support a given allocation of items to bidders in an envy-free way. A bidder will envy another bidder if she would prefer to obtain th...
David Kempe, Ahuva Mu'alem, Mahyar Salek
WINE
2009
Springer
134views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 2 months ago
Contract Auctions for Sponsored Search
In sponsored search auctions advertisers typically pay a fixed amount per click that their advertisements receive. In particular, the advertiser and the publisher enter into a con...
Sharad Goel, Sébastien Lahaie, Sergei Vassi...
WINE
2009
Springer
111views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 2 months ago
Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions
A potential downside of prediction markets is that they may incentivize agents to take undesirable actions in the real world. For example, a prediction market for whether a terrori...
Peng Shi, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo
WINE
2009
Springer
179views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 2 months ago
Betting on the Real Line
We study the problem of designing prediction markets for random variables with continuous or countably infinite outcomes on the real line. Our interval betting languages allow tra...
Xi Gao, Yiling Chen, David M. Pennock