We develop a general method for proving properties of contract-signing protocols using a specialized protocol logic. The method is applied to the Asokan-ShoupWaidner and the Garay...
Michael Backes, Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. ...
We present the first cryptographically sound Dolev-Yaostyle security proof of a comprehensive electronic payment system. The payment system is a slightly simplified variant of t...
We study an automatic technique for the verification of cryptographic protocols based on a Horn clause model of the protocol. This technique yields proofs valid for an unbounded ...
Modelling security policies requires means to specify permissions and prohibitions. However, this is generally not sufficient to express security properties such as availability ...
We consider expansions of the Abadi-Rogaway logic of indistinguishability of formal cryptographic expressions. We expand the logic in order to cover cases when partial information...
In the analysis of security protocols, the knowledge of attackers is often described in terms of message deducibility and indistinguishability relations. In this paper, we pursue ...
Authentication and secrecy properties are proved by very different methods: the former by local reasoning, leading to matching knowledge of all principals about the order of their...
This paper advocates a novel approach to the construction of secure software: controlling information flow and maintaining integrity via monadic encapsulation of effects. This ap...
It is sometimes desirable to allow access to open ports on a firewall only to authorized external users and present closed ports to all others. We examine ways to construct an au...
Rennie deGraaf, John Aycock, Michael J. Jacobson J...
User-centered security has been identified as a grand challenge in information security and assurance. It is on the brink of becoming an established subdomain of both security and...