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Tolerable Manipulability in Dynamic Assignment without Money
14 years 4 months ago
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www.eecs.harvard.edu
We study a problem of dynamic allocation without money. Agents have arrivals and departures and strict preferences over items. Strategyproofness requires the use of an arriva...
James Zou, Sujit Gujar, and David C. Parkes
posted by
sujit
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