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CORR
2010
Springer
95views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 9 months ago
Single-Call Mechanisms
Following Babaioff, Kleinberg, and Slivkins [4], we study single-call mechanisms — truthful mechanisms that evaluate an allocation function only once per instantiation. First, w...
Balasubramanian Sivan, Christopher A. Wilkens
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
164views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2010»
14 years 4 months ago
Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for singl...
Moshe Babaioff, Robert D. Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Sl...
ATAL
2009
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions
A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule that defines the allocation of goods for each agent, and a payment rule that defines the payment of each winner....
Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sa...