CORR
2008
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2008
Springer
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing in...
ATAL
2006
Springer
14 years 3 months ago
2006
Springer
This paper develops a new combinatorial auction protocol called the Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation (GM-SMA). This protocol satisfies the following characteristics:...
Publication
There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n
competing agents (n > p) each with unit demand. It is
required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment
problem ...
Publication
In this paper, we consider a decentralized supply chain formation problem for linear, multi-echelon supply chains when the managers of the individual echelons are autonomous, ratio...
Publication
In this paper, we seek to design a Groves mechanism for
assigning p heterogeneous objects among n competing agents (n > p)
with unit demand, satisfying weak budget balance, in...
Publication
There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n competing agents (n > p)
each with unit demand. It is required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment problem
s...