Sciweavers

ICS
2010
Tsinghua U.
14 years 8 months ago
Space-Efficient Estimation of Robust Statistics and Distribution Testing
: The generic problem of estimation and inference given a sequence of i.i.d. samples has been extensively studied in the statistics, property testing, and learning communities. A n...
Steve Chien, Katrina Ligett, Andrew McGregor
ICS
2010
Tsinghua U.
14 years 8 months ago
Robustness of the Learning with Errors Assumption
: Starting with the work of Ishai-Sahai-Wagner and Micali-Reyzin, a new goal has been set within the theory of cryptography community, to design cryptographic primitives that are s...
Shafi Goldwasser, Yael Kalai, Chris Peikert, Vinod...
ICS
2010
Tsinghua U.
14 years 8 months ago
Local Algorithms for Finding Interesting Individuals in Large Networks
: We initiate the study of local, sublinear time algorithms for finding vertices with extreme topological properties -- such as high degree or clustering coefficient -- in large so...
Mickey Brautbar, Michael Kearns
ICS
2010
Tsinghua U.
14 years 8 months ago
Circumventing the Price of Anarchy: Leading Dynamics to Good Behavior
: Many natural games can have a dramatic difference between the quality of their best and worst Nash equilibria, even in pure strategies. Yet, nearly all work to date on dynamics s...
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour
ICS
2010
Tsinghua U.
14 years 8 months ago
Reaching Consensus on Social Networks
Abstract: Research in sociology studies the effectiveness of social networks in achieving computational tasks. Typically the agents who are supposed to achieve a task are unaware o...
Elchanan Mossel, Grant Schoenebeck
ICS
2010
Tsinghua U.
14 years 8 months ago
Market Equilibrium under Separable, Piecewise-Linear, Concave Utilities
We consider Fisher and Arrow-Debreu markets under additively-separable, piecewise-linear, concave utility functions, and obtain the following results: ? For both market models, if...
Vijay V. Vazirani, Mihalis Yannakakis
ICS
2010
Tsinghua U.
14 years 8 months ago
Beyond Equilibria: Mechanisms for Repeated Combinatorial Auctions
: We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. W...
Brendan Lucier
ICS
2010
Tsinghua U.
14 years 8 months ago
A New Look at Selfish Routing
: We revisit price of anarchy in network routing, in a new model in which routing decisions are made by self-interested components of the network, as opposed to by the flows as in ...
Christos Papadimitriou, Gregory Valiant
ICS
2010
Tsinghua U.
14 years 8 months ago
Adversarial Leakage in Games
Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tenne...