This site uses cookies to deliver our services and to ensure you get the best experience. By continuing to use this site, you consent to our use of cookies and acknowledge that you have read and understand our Privacy Policy, Cookie Policy, and Terms
We extend a particular access control framework, the Privilege Calculus, with a possibility to override denied access for increased flexibility in hard to define or unanticipated...
Erik Rissanen, Babak Sadighi Firozabadi, Marek J. ...
The most studied property, secrecy, is not always sufficient to prove the security of a protocol. Other properties such as anonymity, privacy or opacity could be useful. Here, we u...
Interactive access control allows a server to compute and communicate on the fly the missing credentials to a client and to adapt its responses on the basis of presented and decli...
This paper focuses on the usability of the PINPAS tool. The PINPAS tool is an instruction-level interpreter for smartcard assembler languages, augmented with facilities to study si...
Cryptographic protocols often make use of nested cryptographic primitives, for example signed message digests, or encrypted signed messages. Gordon and Jeffrey’s prior work on ty...
Current firewall configuration languages have no well founded semantics. Each firewall implements its own algorithm that parses specific proprietary languages. The main conseq...
We propose a language that allows agents to distribute data with usage policies in a decentralized architecture. In our framework, the compliance with usage policies is not enforce...
Ricardo Corin, Sandro Etalle, J. I. den Hartog, Ga...
Abstract The computational proof model of Bellare and Rogaway for cryptographic protocol analysis is complemented by providing a formal specification of the actions of the adversa...
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Colin Boyd, Yvonne Hitchco...