This site uses cookies to deliver our services and to ensure you get the best experience. By continuing to use this site, you consent to our use of cookies and acknowledge that you have read and understand our Privacy Policy, Cookie Policy, and Terms
We consider the problem of designing mechanisms for online problems in which agents arrive over time and the mechanism is unaware of the agent until the agent announces her arriva...
This paper takes the first steps towards designing incentive compatible mechanisms for hierarchical decision making problems involving selfish agents. We call these Stackelberg p...
Roberts’ theorem from 1979 states that the only incentive compatible mechanisms over a full domain and range of at least 3 are weighted variants of the VCG mechanism termed affin...
We study the Cost-Per-Action or Cost-Per-Acquisition (CPA) charging scheme in online advertising. In this scheme, instead of paying per click, the advertisers pay only when a user...