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SIGECOM
2009
ACM
76views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 1 months ago
Self-correcting sampling-based dynamic multi-unit auctions
Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
139views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 1 months ago
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...
Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
114views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 1 months ago
Policy teaching through reward function learning
Policy teaching considers a Markov Decision Process setting in which an interested party aims to influence an agent’s decisions by providing limited incentives. In this paper, ...
Haoqi Zhang, David C. Parkes, Yiling Chen
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
109views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 1 months ago
A new perspective on implementation by voting trees
Voting trees describe an iterative procedure for selecting a single vertex from a tournament. vide a very general abstract model of decision-making among a group of individuals, a...
Felix A. Fischer, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alex Samorod...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
108views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 1 months ago
Selling ad campaigns: online algorithms with cancellations
We study online pricing problems in markets with cancellations, i.e., markets in which prior allocation decisions can be revoked, but at a cost. In our model, a seller receives re...
Moshe Babaioff, Jason D. Hartline, Robert D. Klein...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
93views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 1 months ago
Managing the quality of CPC traffic
Bobji Mungamuru, Hector Garcia-Molina
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
216views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 1 months ago
Approximate mechanism design without money
The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot b...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
132views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 1 months ago
Limited and online supply and the bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design
We study auctions for selling a limited supply of a single commodity in the case where the supply is known in advance and the case it is unknown and must be instead allocated in a...
Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
137views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 1 months ago
An exact almost optimal algorithm for target set selection in social networks
The Target Set Selection problem proposed by Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos, gives a nice clean combinatorial formulation for many problems arising in economy, sociology, and medicin...
Oren Ben-Zwi, Danny Hermelin, Daniel Lokshtanov, I...