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WINE
2005
Springer
182views Economy» more  WINE 2005»
14 years 27 days ago
Inapproximability Results for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Utility Functions
We consider the following allocation problem arising in the setting of combinatorial auctions: a set of goods is to be allocated to a set of players so as to maximize the sum of t...
Subhash Khot, Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markaki...
WINE
2009
Springer
194views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 2 months ago
Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders
A well-known result due to Vickery gives a mechanism for selling a number of goods to interested buyers in a way that achieves the maximum social welfare. In practice, a problem wi...
Ravi Kumar, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Sayedi