CORR
2002
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2002
Springer
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism de...
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
14 years 4 months ago
2003
ACM
In this paper we study the mechanism design problem of coalition formation and cost sharing in an electronic marketplace, where buyers can form coalitions to take advantage of dis...
ATAL
2005
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
2005
Springer
The central mechanism design problem is to develop incentives for agents to truthfully reveal their preferences over different outcomes, so that the system-wide outcome chosen by ...
FOCS
2008
IEEE
14 years 6 months ago
2008
IEEE
The central problem in computational mechanism design is the tension between incentive compatibility and computational ef ciency. We establish the rst significant approximability ...