CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2010
Springer
For revenue and welfare maximization in singledimensional Bayesian settings, Chawla et al. (STOC10) recently showed that sequential posted-price mechanisms (SPMs), though simple i...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the problem of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanism design in settings where agents' types evolve over time as a function of their (both public and private) experien...
SODA
2004
ACM
14 years 24 days ago
2004
ACM
We consider the problem of picking (buying) an inexpensive s-t path in a graph where edges are owned by independent (selfish) agents, and the cost of an edge is known to its owner...
Publication
Abstract: The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (singl...