We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in symmetric additively-separable hedonic games. These coalition formation games are specified by an undirected e...
The PPAD-completeness of Nash equilibrium computation is taken as evidence that the problem is computationally hard in the worst case. This evidence is necessarily rather weak, in ...
A key solution concept in cooperative game theory is the core. The core of an expense sharing game contains stable allocations of the total cost to the participating players, such ...
Reshef Meir, Yoram Bachrach, Jeffrey S. Rosenschei...
We investigate the computational aspects of safe manipulation, a new model of coalitional manipulation that was recently put forward by Slinko and White [11]. In this model, a pot...
Can learning algorithms find a Nash equilibrium? This is a natural question for several reasons. Learning algorithms resemble the behavior of players in many naturally arising gam...
Constantinos Daskalakis, Rafael Frongillo, Christo...
Recent results showing PPAD-completeness of the problem of computing an equilibrium for Fisher’s market model under additively separable, piecewise-linear, concave utilities (pl...