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Probability forecasters who are rewarded via a proper scoring rule may care not only about the score, but also about their performance relative to other forecasters. We model this...
We explore settings where a principal must make a decision about which action to take to achieve a desired outcome. The principal elicits the probability of achieving the outcome ...
This paper reports on the design of a novel two-stage mechanism, based on strictly proper scoring rules, that motivates selfish rational agents to make a costly probabilistic estim...
Athanasios Papakonstantinou, Alex Rogers, Enrico H...
Scoring rules are a broad and concisely-representable class of voting rules which includes, for example, Plurality and Borda. Our main result asserts that the class of scoring rul...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Aviv Zohar, Jeffrey S. Rosensc...
We study information elicitation mechanisms in which a principal agent attempts to elicit the private information of other agents using a carefully selected payment scheme based o...
In this paper we present lessons learned in the Evaluating Predictive Uncertainty Challenge. We describe the methods we used in regression challenges, including our winning method ...