Prediction markets efficiently extract and aggregate the private information held by individuals about events and facts that can be publicly verified. However, facts such as the e...
Full revelation of private values is impractical in many large-scale markets, where posted price mechanisms are a simpler alternative. In this work, we compare the asymptotic beha...
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidde...
Vahab S. Mirrokni, Michael Schapira, Jan Vondr&aac...
We consider the problem of query rewrites in the context of keyword advertisement. Given a three-layer graph consisting of queries, query rewrites, and the corresponding ads that ...
Azarakhsh Malekian, Chi-Chao Chang, Ravi Kumar, Gr...
Online peer production systems have enabled people to coactively create, share, classify, and rate content on an unprecedented scale. This paper describes strong macroscopic regul...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that (in unrestricted settings) any reasonable voting rule is manipulable. Recently, a quantitative version of this theorem was proved by ...
We consider the amount of communication required to verify the outcome of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism: an efficient allocation together with incentivizing VCG paymen...