This site uses cookies to deliver our services and to ensure you get the best experience. By continuing to use this site, you consent to our use of cookies and acknowledge that you have read and understand our Privacy Policy, Cookie Policy, and Terms
We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first consider a model where...
Enrico Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash, David C. K. Yuen,...
We investigate equilibrium strategies for bidding agents that participate in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. For this setting, previous rese...
Enrico H. Gerding, Zinovi Rabinovich, Andrew Byde,...
We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first consider a mo...
Enrico H. Gerding, Rajdeep K. Dash, David C. K. Yu...