This paper studies a resource allocation problem introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou. The scenario is modelled as a multiple-player game in which each player selects one o...
Petra Berenbrink, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Gol...
Following recent interest in the strong price of anarchy (SPOA), we consider this measure, as well as the well known price of anarchy (POA) for the job scheduling problem on two u...
It is well known that the selfish behavior of users in a network can be regulated through the imposition of the so-called optimal taxes on the network edges. Any traffic equilibriu...
We quantify the effect of Bayesian ignorance by comparing the social cost obtained in a Bayesian game by agents with local views to the expected social cost of agents having glob...
Noga Alon, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Moshe Tenne...
Abstract. In this work, we consider an interesting variant of the wellstudied KP model [18] for selfish routing that reflects some influence from the much older Wardrop model [3...
We study the relationship between the social cost of correlated equilibria and the social cost of Nash equilibria. In contrast to previous work focusing on the possible benefits ...
Milan Bradonjic, Gunes Ercal-Ozkaya, Adam Meyerson...
Mediators are third parties to whom the players in a game can delegate the task of choosing a strategy; a mediator forms a mediated equilibrium if delegating is a best response for...
Joshua R. Davis, David Liben-Nowell, Alexa Sharp, ...
We consider the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games with linear latency functions. For asymmetric games, the price of anarchy of maximum social cost is ( ...