Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college st...
Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Christina Lee, Anthony Cho...
We study a many-to-many generalisation of the well-known stable roommates problem in which each participant seeks to be matched with a number of others. We present a linear-time a...
We consider the following version of the stable matching problem. Suppose that men have preferences for women, women have preferences for dogs, and dogs have preferences for men. T...
Let I be a stable matching instance with N stable matchings. For each man m, order his (not necessarily distinct) N partners from his most preferred to his least preferred. Denote...
Abstract. We consider the variant of the classical Stable Marriage problem where preference lists can be incomplete and may contain ties. In such a setting, finding a stable matchi...
We consider variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which preference lists may contain ties, and may be of bounded length. Such restrictions arise naturally in practic...
At Financial Crypto 2006, Golle presented a novel framework for the privacy preserving computation of a stable matching (stable marriage). We show that the communication complexity...
Matthew K. Franklin, Mark Gondree, Payman Mohassel
We study the problem of allocating students to projects, where both students and lecturers have preferences over projects, and both projects and lecturers have capacities. In this...
Abstract. In this paper, we propose a new approach, parallel iterative improvement (PII), to solving the stable matching problem. This approach treats the stable matching problem a...