: We revisit price of anarchy in network routing, in a new model in which routing decisions are made by self-interested components of the network, as opposed to by the flows as in ...
We consider Fisher and Arrow-Debreu markets under additively-separable, piecewise-linear, concave utility functions, and obtain the following results: ? For both market models, if...
: We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. W...
: We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic resu...
feuse of its devstting eets in utions nd other mehnismsD ollusion is prohiited nd leglly proseutedF etD olluders hve lwys existedD nd my ontinue to existF e thus rise the followin...