— The Web has become the most popular place for people to acquire information. Unfortunately, it is widely recognized that the Web contains a significant amount of untruthful inf...
In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single commodity, such as a res...
We study the question of how to easily recognize whether a social unction f from an abstract type space to a set of outcomes is truthful, i.e. implementable by a truthful mechanis...
We study the problem of designing truthful algorithms for scheduling a set of tasks, each one owned by a selfish agent, to a set of parallel (identical or unrelated) machines in or...
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items to players having additive utility functions over the items. We consider allocations in which no player envies the bun...
Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiot...
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for singl...
Moshe Babaioff, Robert D. Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Sl...
Abstract. We consider the problem of scheduling jobs on related machines owned by selfish agents and provide the first deterministic mechanisms with constant approximation that a...
Vincenzo Auletta, Roberto De Prisco, Paolo Penna, ...
This paper concerns the design of mechanisms for online scheduling in which agents bid for access to a re-usable resource such as processor time or wireless network access. Each a...
Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mo...
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also bounds ...
With the evolution of e-commerce, privacy is becoming a major concern. Many e-companies employ collaborative filtering (CF) techniques to increase their sales by providing truthfu...