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ICALP
2010
Springer
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Programming Languages
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ICALP 2010
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On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
14 years 1 months ago
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www.cs.toronto.edu
We study the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Of particular interest is the special ca...
Allan Borodin, Brendan Lucier
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