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SIGECOM
2008
ACM
155views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
13 years 11 months ago
Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions
We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidde...
Vahab S. Mirrokni, Michael Schapira, Jan Vondr&aac...
SAGT
2009
Springer
177views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations
We study implementability in dominant strategies of social choice functions when sets of types are multi-dimensional and convex, sets of outcomes are arbitrary, valuations for outc...
André Berger, Rudolf Müller, Seyed Hos...