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The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
We study a representative task allocation problem called shortest paths: Let G be a graph in which the edges are owned by self interested agents. The cost of each edge is privatel...
We study the problem of how to allocate m identical items among n > m agents, assuming each agent desires exactly one item and has a private value for consuming the item. We as...
Geoffroy de Clippel, Victor Naroditskiy, Amy R. Gr...
Roberts’ theorem from 1979 states that the only incentive compatible mechanisms over a full domain and range of at least 3 are weighted variants of the VCG mechanism termed affin...