In this paper, we propose a simple framework to characterize the switching behavior between search engines based on click streams. We segment users into a number of categories bas...
We consider a class of networks where n agents need to send their traffic from a given source to a given destination over m identical, non-intersecting, and parallel links. For suc...
This paper takes the first steps towards designing incentive compatible mechanisms for hierarchical decision making problems involving selfish agents. We call these Stackelberg p...
Owing to numerous potential applications, wireless sensor networks have been the focus of a lot of research efforts lately. In this note we study one fundamental issue in such net...
Abstract. We provide the first strongly polynomial time exact combinatorial algorithm to compute Fisher equilibrium for the case when utility functions do not satisfy the Gross su...
Dinesh Garg, Kamal Jain, Kunal Talwar, Vijay V. Va...
We study a model of path-vector routing in which nodes’ routing policies are based on subjective cost assessments of alternative routes. The routes are constrained by the requir...
Joan Feigenbaum, David R. Karger, Vahab S. Mirrokn...
We give a simple analysis of the competitive ratio of the random sampling auction from [10]. The random sampling auction was first shown to be worst-case competitive in [9] (with ...
Uriel Feige, Abraham Flaxman, Jason D. Hartline, R...
Organizational employees have different knowledge demands and the knowledge is compound. So how to push the right compound knowledge to the right organizational employees becomes i...
Zhi-Ping Fan, Yong Feng, Yong-Hong Sun, Bo Feng, T...
Abstract. We give a simple characterization of all single-item truthrevealing auctions under some mild (and natural) assumptions about the auctions. Our work opens up the possibili...
Kamal Jain, Aranyak Mehta, Kunal Talwar, Vijay V. ...
A sharing community prospers when participation and contribution are both high. We suggest both, while being related decisions every peer makes, should be given separate rational ...