Evolutionary models in which N players are repeatedly matched to play a game have “fast convergence” to a set A if the models both reach A quickly and leave A slowly, where ...
__________________________________________________________________________________ We study optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy (SOE) with sovereign and private default r...
Behavioral economics struggles to explain why people sometimes evaluate outcomes separately (narrow bracketing of mental accounts) and sometimes jointly (broad bracketing). We dev...
On average, “young” people underestimate whereas “old” people overestimate their chances to survive into the future. We adopt a Bayesian learning model of ambiguous surviv...
We analyze a principal-agent problem with moral hazard where a principal searches for an opportunity of uncertain return, and hires an agent to evaluate available options. The age...
A seller maximizes revenue from selling an object in a dynamic environment, with buyers that differ in their patience: Each buyer has a privately known deadline for buying and a p...
This paper presents a collection of convergence results on best-response dynamics in extensive-form games. We prove that in all finite generic extensive-form games of perfect inf...
We provide easily-verifiable sufficient conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game to guarantee the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium. We allow playe...
When the fair outcome optimizes an unambiguous index of fairness, the presence of exogenous, normatively neutral, constraints complicates the optimization problem but raises no co...