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    Computational Mechanism Design

    15 years 10 months ago
    Computational Mechanism Design
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    Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency Ph.D. dissertation, Univesity of Pennsylvania, May, 2001. The focus of this chapter is on the Generalized Vickrey Auction, and combinatorial allocation problems. In particular, I consider approaches to address the computational complexity of winner determination, the valuation complexity of participation in an auction, and the communication costs of different mechanisms.
    David Parkes
    posted by sujit
    Added 05 Jan 2009
    Updated 05 Jan 2009
    Authors David Parkes
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